Beginning in the mid-1970s, the incarceration rate in the United States began to skyrocket, increasing rapidly during the “War on Drugs” in the 1980s and continuing to rise as states began to adopt three-strikes laws. The exponential increase in the prison population inevitably led to an increase in prisoner grievances. In 1995, the year prior to the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners filed 41,679 civil rights actions nationwide, more than double the number of such actions filed a decade earlier. Prisoner civil rights actions accounted for more than thirteen percent of all civil cases filed in the federal district courts, and the estimated cost of inmate lawsuits totaled $81 million. Given the high frequency of prisoner civil rights claims as well as the escalating costs associated with prisoner litigation, lawmakers grew concerned that federal courts were being inundated with expensive cases that lacked merit. Members of Congress emphasized that “prisoner litigation does not operate in a vacuum,” but rather “tie[s] up the courts, waste[s] valuable legal resources, and affect[s] the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”
Lawmakers’ concerns intensified in light of the small fraction of meritorious inmate claims. The vast majority of inmates who file lawsuits ultimately fail to secure a favorable judgment, as the bulk of claims are later deemed frivolous.
In 1996, Congress hastily passed the PLRA following limited congressional debate. This Note examines a recent circuit split concerning one of the PLRA’s central provisions, a limitation on the amount of attorney’s fees which may be awarded for successful representation of an inmate. Part II outlines the development of the PLRA and the circumstances surrounding the pertinent legislative history. Part III discusses three germane provisions of the PLRA: (A) the requirement of exhausting alternative remedies prior to filing complaints, (B) the physical injury requirement, and (C) the limitation on attorney’s fees. Part IV analyzes a recent circuit split between the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit over the application of the PLRA’s attorney’s fee cap when fees have been accumulated defending a judgment on appeal. Emphasis is placed on evaluating the Sixth Circuit’s and Ninth Circuit’s rationales for determining whether the cap on attorney’s fees applies to appellate fees in addition to fees accrued in order to secure an initial monetary judgment on behalf of a prisoner. Finally, this Note evaluates the practical and policy implications of interpreting the PLRA’s fee cap to limit an award of appellate fees, advocating for the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in Woods v. Carey.